4 citations · 5 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2023★ 4 cited
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in e…
econ.TH2023★ 1 cited
The Bounds of Mediated Communication
Roberto Corrao, Yifan Dai
We study sender-receiver games with transparent motives, where an uninformed, sender-aligned mediator commits to a communication mechanism but cannot verify the sender's report. We…
econ.TH2022
Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approac…