4 papers
Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters
Maxim Senkov, Arseniy Samsonov
We compare two scenarios in a model where politicians offer local public goods to heterogeneous voters: one where politicians have access to data on voters and thus can target spec…
Changing Simplistic Worldviews
Maxim Senkov, Toygar T. Kerman
We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different…
Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade
Maxim Senkov
A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long…
Optimally Biased Expertise
Pavel Ilinov, Andrei Matveenko, Maxim Senkov +1
We show that in delegation problems, a principal benefits from belief misalignment vis-à-vis an agent when the latter can flexibly acquire costly information. The agent optimally s…