6 papers
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta
Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency.…
Score-based mechanisms
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification.…
Purchase history and product personalization
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows firms to better tailor products to consumers' tastes, but the mere choice of a product ca…
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We sh…
Constrained Information Design
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by extending the insight in Le Treust and Tomala (2019) to the case of multiple inequality…
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical cla…