2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2026
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta
Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency.…
econ.TH2024
Score-based mechanisms
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification.…
econ.TH2023★ 2 cited
Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives
Victor Augias, Eduardo Perez-Richet
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogen…