5 papers · 1 filter
Strategy-proof and Efficient Job Matching with Participation Constraints
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker…
Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object,…
Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools
Debasis Mishra, Soumendu Sarkar, Arunava Sen +2
The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to a…
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
Debasis Mishra, Kolagani Paramahamsa
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the obj…
Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechan…