8 papers
MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets
Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching mark…
Compatible -Relaxations of Fairness and Non-Wastefulness Under Hereditary Constraints
Tenma Wakasugi, Zhaohong Sun, Kei Kimura +1
We study two-sided matching markets under hereditary constraints, which extend beyond simple capacity limits and arise in applications such as diversity requirements and refugee re…
Maximally Diverse Stable Matchings: Optimizing Arbitrary Institutional Objectives
Gergely Csáji, Zhaohong Sun
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distr…
Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games
Yao Zhang, Indrajit Saha, Zhaohong Sun +1
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depen…
Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy
Noga Klein Elmalem, Haris Aziz, Rica Gonen +7
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where…
Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Games
Haris Aziz, Yuhang Guo, Zhaohong Sun
This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each tim…