3 papers
econ.TH2026
Withholding Verifiable Information
Denis Shishkin, Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. Whi…
econ.TH2026
From Design to Disclosure
S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's d…
econ.TH2026
Redeeming Falsifiability?
Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our…