3 papers
cs.GT2026
Adversarial procurement in blockchains
Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
An emerging blockchain protocol design pattern leverages the asymmetry between the computational effort in performing versus verifying tasks. For example, cryptographic validity pr…
cs.GT2026
Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Pranav Garimidi, Michael Neuder, Tim Roughgarden
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the…
cs.GT2025
Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards
Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. Carlste…