3 papers
cs.GT2026
Incentive Design in Competitive Resource Allocation: Exploiting Valuation Asymmetry in Tullock Contests
Gilberto Diaz-Garcia, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the inform…
cs.GT2024
The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games
Gilberto Diaz-Garcia, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
Resource allocation in adversarial environments is a fundamental challenge across various domains, from corporate competition to military strategy. This article examines the impact…
cs.GT2024
Strategic Coalitions in Networked Contest Games
Gilberto Diaz-Garcia, Francesco Bullo, Jason R. Marden
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games off…