3 papers
econ.TH2026
Algorithm Transparency and Search Manipulation: Steering vs. Persuasion
Raphael Boleslavsky, Thomas Jungbauer, Mehdi Shadmehr
We study a platform that prefers to sell the more profitable of two products. It designs an algorithm that determines the product the consumer encounters first, conditional on her…
econ.TH2026
Revealed and Concealed Repression: Theory and Measurement
Maria Titova, Nathan Canen, Emily Hencken Ritter +1
Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. T…
econ.TH2025
Signaling With Commitment
Raphael Boleslavsky, Mehdi Shadmehr
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability dist…