From the 1 of 5 linked papers with an AI index.
1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Efficiency Adjustments Break the Logarithmic Rank Barrier
Josue Ortega, Geng Zhao, Gabriel Ziegler
We study the expected average rank achieved by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism in i.i.d.\ matching markets. While student-proposing Deferred Acceptance…
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The paper demonstrates that in large random matching markets, any stable matching—such as the student‑proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm—is almost surely Pareto‑inefficient, w…
Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning
Shuige Liu, Gabriel Ziegler
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct…
The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets
Josué Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of p…
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…