From the 1 of 8 linked papers with an AI index.
1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Efficiency Adjustments Break the Logarithmic Rank Barrier
Josue Ortega, Geng Zhao, Gabriel Ziegler
We study the expected average rank achieved by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism in i.i.d.\ matching markets. While student-proposing Deferred Acceptance…
Asymptotic Equivalence of Immediate and Deferred Acceptance
Josue Ortega
Immediate Acceptance (IA, also known as the Boston mechanism) is commonly used to assign students to schools because it produces a Pareto-efficient matching if parents report their…
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The paper demonstrates that in large random matching markets, any stable matching—such as the student‑proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm—is almost surely Pareto‑inefficient, w…
Justifiable Priority Violations
Josué Ortega, R. Pablo Arribillaga
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask…
Experimental School Choice with Parents
Mikhail Freer, Thilo Klein, Josué Ortega
We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents-the relevant decision makers in the field-are the experimental subjects. We compare Deferred Acceptance (D…
The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets
Josué Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of p…