3 papers
cs.GT2025
How to sell a service with uncertain outcomes
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Alec Sun, Haifeng Xu +1
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of u…
cs.GT2023
Markov Persuasion Processes with Endogenous Agent Beliefs
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu, You Zu
We consider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion setting where a single long-lived sender persuades a stream of ``short-lived'' agents (receivers) by sharing information about a payoff-re…
cs.GT2021
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu
Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relev…