1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2026
Compromise by "multimatum"
Federico Echenique, Matías Núñez
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents,…
econ.TH2022
Price & Choose
Federico Echenique, Matías Núñez
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set pri…
cs.GT2021★ 1 cited
An axiomatic derivation of Condorcet-consistent social decision rules
Aurelien Mekuko Yonta, Matias Núñez, Issofa Moyouwou +1
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consi…