5 papers
Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
Joseph Feffer, Filip Tokarski
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set…
Targeting Without Transfers
Filip Tokarski
I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to…
Screening with tolls and damages
Filip Tokarski
A welfare-maximizing designer allocates two kinds of goods using two screening instruments: tolls, whose costs are separable from agents' values, and damages, which are more costly…
Ironing Without Concavification
Filip Tokarski
I propose a new approach to solving standard screening problems when the monotonicity constraint binds. A simple geometric argument shows that when virtual values are quasi-concave…
Equitable screening
Filip Tokarski
A designer distributes goods while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deser…