3 papers
econ.TH2026
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment: Minimal Canonical Contracts
Seungjin Han, Siyang Xiong
Contract theory typically assumes full commitment by the principal, but many contracts fix some payoff-relevant decisions while leaving others discretionary. We ask when imperfect…
econ.TH2024
Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment
Seungjin Han, Andrew Leal
This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechan…
econ.TH2023
Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment
Seungjin Han, Siyang Xiong
In classical contract theory, we usually impose two assumptions: delegated contracts and perfect commitment. While the second assumption is demanding, the first one suffers no loss…