5 papers
On the dimensions of correlated equilibrium polytopes of generic games
Jan Draisma, Linda Hoyer, Irem Portakal
In this paper, we study the dimension of the correlated equilibrium polytope of finite games. Under the oriented-matroid notion of genericity, we prove that if a generic game is no…
A vector bundle approach to Nash equilibria
Hirotachi Abo, Irem Portakal, Luca Sodomaco
We use vector bundles to study the locus of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an -player game in normal form, which we call the Nash equilibrium scheme. When the payoff tensor fo…
Totally mixed conditional independence equilibria of generic games
Matthieu Bouyer, Irem Portakal, Javier Sendra-Arranz
This paper further develops the algebraic--geometric foundations of conditional independence (CI) equilibria, a refinement of dependency equilibria that integrates conditional inde…
Dependency equilibria: Boundary cases and their real algebraic geometry
Irem Portakal, Daniel Windisch
This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both pure and mixed equilibria. In alig…
Game theory of undirected graphical models
Irem Portakal, Javier Sendra-Arranz
An -player game in normal form can be modeled via undirected discrete graphical models where the discrete random variables represent the players and their state spaces are t…