3 papers
econ.TH2026
Truth and Deception
Jeremy Bertomeu, Edwige Cheynel
Organizations rely on languages that imperfectly represent underlying states. We study the interaction of a lying cost, increasing in the distance from the message prescribed by th…
econ.TH2026
Random Disclosure Costs: A Unified Theory of Disclosure
Jeremy Bertomeu, Edwige Cheynel, Keri Hu
We propose a unified framework for a class of evidence games in which a sender, seeking to increase posterior expectations (e.g., a market price), chooses whether to reveal or with…
econ.TH2026
Disclosure under Noisy Information Processing
Jeremy Bertomeu, Edwige Cheynel, Peicong Hu
Capital markets process disclosures with noise. Adding this single friction overturns the standard characterization of costly voluntary disclosure. Firms may unravel to full disclo…