3 papers
cs.GT2026
The End Justifies the Mean: A Linear Ranking Rule for Proportional Sequential Decisions
Carmel Baharav, Niclas Boehmer, Bailey Flanigan +1
AI alignment and participatory design motivate a new democratic design problem: how to collectively choose a decision rule to use repeatedly. We study this problem for linear ranki…
cs.LG2025
Alternates, Assemble! Selecting Optimal Alternates for Citizens' Assemblies
Angelos Assos, Carmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan +1
Citizens' assemblies are an increasingly influential form of deliberative democracy, where randomly selected people discuss policy questions. The legitimacy of these assemblies hin…
cs.GT2025
Condorcet Winners and Anscombes Paradox Under Weighted Binary Voting
Carmel Baharav, Andrei Constantinescu, Roger Wattenhofer
We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to agg…