3 papers
cs.GT2026
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm
We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. S…
cs.GT2025
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains fr…
cs.GT2025
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for…