11 papers
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Federico Fioravanti
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abs…
Lattice operations for the pairwise stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we…
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a u…
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena, Pablo Neme
We study coalition formation problems in the presence of externalities, focusing on settings where agents exhibit myopic expectations, that is, they evaluate potential deviations b…
Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem
Adriana Amieva, AgustÃn G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we invest…
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…