activity
20072019
most citedStrategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall

16 citations · 26 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

cs.AI20192 cited

Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The paper investigates the second-order blameworthiness or duty to warn modality "one coalition knew how another coalition could have prevented an outcome". The main technical resu…

cs.AI2018

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, th…

cs.AI2018

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition…

cs.AI20178 cited

Together We Know How to Achieve: An Epistemic Logic of Know-How (Extended Abstract)

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean…

cs.AI201716 cited

Strategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one propose…

cs.AI2017

Together We Know How to Achieve: An Epistemic Logic of Know-How

Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean…