202 citations · 339 across the 38 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Principal-agent problems with adverse selection: A stochastic target problem formulation
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Ibrahim Ekren, Liwei Huang
We study a principal-agent problem with adverse selection, where the principal does not know the agent's true cost but must design a contract to optimize a specific criterion. Unli…
Contracting with discretionary bonuses
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Ibrahim Ekren, Liwei Huang
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing…
Contracting a crowd of heterogeneous agents
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Erhan Bayraktar, Ibrahim Ekren
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadrat…