3 papers
econ.TH2026
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…
cs.GT2025
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Aditya Aradhye, David Lagziel, Eilon Solan
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponent…
econ.TH2025
Constrained Mediation: Bayesian Implementability of Joint Posteriors
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We examine information structures in settings with privately informed agents and an informationally constrained mediator who supplies additional public signals. Our focus is on cha…