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econ.TH2026
Strategy-Proof Set-Valued Choice on Single-Dipped Domains
Arkarup Basu Mallik, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study strategy-proof social choice where agents have single-dipped preferences and outcomes may be sets of alternatives. While point-valued strategy-proof rules select an endpoi…
econ.TH2026
Envy-free, efficient and strategy-proof division of a heterogeneous good between two agents
Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study the division of between two agents, each receiving a closed subinterval, under ordinal preferences that need not be additive. A monotonic preference has a unique b…
econ.TH2026
Stable Matching with Choice Correspondences: Beyond Path Independence
Varun Bansal, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study stable matching with agents' choice correspondences as primitives. For many-to-many markets we introduce Individually Rational Persistence (IRP), which admits status-quo p…