5 papers
Contracting a crowd of heterogeneous agents
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Erhan Bayraktar, Ibrahim Ekren
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadrat…
Principal-agent problems with adverse selection: A stochastic target problem formulation
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Ibrahim Ekren, Liwei Huang
We study a principal-agent problem with adverse selection, where the principal does not know the agent's true cost but must design a contract to optimize a specific criterion. Unli…
Contracting with discretionary bonuses
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Ibrahim Ekren, Liwei Huang
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing…
Neural Operators Can Play Dynamic Stackelberg Games
Guillermo Alvarez, Ibrahim Ekren, Anastasis Kratsios +1
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately…
Sequential optimal contracting in continuous time
Guillermo Alonso Alvarez, Erhan Bayraktar, Ibrahim Ekren +1
In this paper we study a principal-agent problem in continuous time with multiple lump-sum payments (contracts) paid at different deterministic times. We reduce the non-zero sum St…