2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
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econ.TH2024
Optimal Wage Band for Job Matching with Signaling
Seungjin Han, Alex Sam, Youngki Shin
We study an optimal wage band problem in a competitive matching labor market where education signals worker ability. We prove uniqueness of the competitive signaling equilibrium un…
econ.TH2023
Optimal Delegation in Markets for Matching with Signaling
Seungjin Han, Alex Sam, Youngki Shin
This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants to regulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling.…
econ.TH2021★ 2 cited
Monotone Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Signaling
Seungjin Han, Alex Sam, Youngki Shin
We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE…