3 papers
cs.GT2026
Second-Best Bilateral Trade is Efficient
Zhengyang Liu, Ying Qin, Zeyu Ren +1
The landmark Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes a fundamental impossibility in bilateral trade: no Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism can simultaneously achieve ex-post…
cs.GT2023
Improved Approximation Ratios of Fixed-Price Mechanisms in Bilateral Trades
Zhengyang Liu, Zeyu Ren, Zihe Wang
We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several settin…
cs.GT2022
On the Distortion of Multi-winner Election Using Single-Candidate Ballots
Gennaro Auricchio, Zeyu Ren, Zihe Wang +1
In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only repo…