1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions
Kiho Yoon
We study optimal auction design when the direction of bidders' deviations is restricted. We show that the optimal revenue when bidders can only underbid their true values cannot ex…
Demand reduction and initial endowments in consignment auctions
Kiho Yoon
Consignment auctions, in which bidders first receive free initial endowments of a good and must then consign them to a subsequent uniform price auction, are often used in emissions…
Optimal selling time with evolving private information
Kiho Yoon
We study the problem of when to sell one indivisible object to a buyer whose value from immediate allocation follows a privately observed Markov process. Incomplete information tra…
Robust double auction mechanisms
Kiho Yoon
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-…
The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains
Kiho Yoon
This paper examines necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms when the domain of valuations is restricted. Our approach is to appropriatel…