2 citations · 2 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
How to Beat FCFS
Itai Ashlagi, Joseph Root
We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. A…
A Theory of Network Games Part 1: Utility Representations
Joseph Root, Evan Sadler
We provide interpretable axiomatic foundations for utilities used in network games and identify several principled generalizations. First, we demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature…
Stable Matching as Transport: a Welfarist Perspective on Market Design
Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family…
A Topological Proof of The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Yuliy Baryshnikov, Joseph Root
We give a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. We construct two topological spaces: one for the space of preference profiles and another for the space of outcomes. We sh…
Local Priority Mechanisms
Joseph Root, David S. Ahn
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assign…
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
Sophie Bade, Joseph Root
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which…
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where…
Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
Joseph Root, David S. Ahn
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple…