1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Designing Signals for Deterrence
Hiroto Sawada, Raphael Boleslavsky, Kristopher W. Ramsay +1
States and alliances spend enormous resources signaling resolve to deter adversaries. Two canonical strategies are burning money (sunk costs) and burning bridges (audience costs).…
Algorithm Transparency and Search Manipulation: Steering vs. Persuasion
Raphael Boleslavsky, Thomas Jungbauer, Mehdi Shadmehr
We study a platform that prefers to sell the more profitable of two products. It designs an algorithm that determines the product the consumer encounters first, conditional on her…
Signaling With Commitment
Raphael Boleslavsky, Mehdi Shadmehr
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability dist…
Waiting for Fake News
Raphael Boleslavsky
This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff a…