3 papers
cs.CR2026
Slow and Steady: Preventing MEV with Verifiable Delays
Zeta Avarikioti, Dimitris Karakostas, Karl Kreder +1
Our work presents a defense mechanism against Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) opportunities in distributed ledgers. The mechanism relies on the idea of enforcing a verifiable delay…
cs.GT2025
Optimal Reward Allocation via Proportional Splitting
Lukas Aumayr, Zeta Avarikioti, Dimitris Karakostas +2
Following the publication of Bitcoin's arguably most famous attack, selfish mining, various works have introduced mechanisms to enhance blockchain systems' game-theoretic resilienc…
cs.GT2023
Majority is Not Required: A Rational Analysis of the Private Double-Spend Attack from a Sub-Majority Adversary
Yanni Georghiades, Rajesh Mishra, Karl Kreder +1
We study the incentives behind double-spend attacks on Nakamoto-style Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies. In these systems, miners are allowed to choose which transactions to reference…