3 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
Showing econ.THShow all
3 papers · 1 filter
econ.TH2023★ 1 cited
A Comparison of Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium: Different Concepts of Cursedness in Dynamic Games
Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cursed Equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) has been a leading theory for explaining winner's-curse-type behavior in static Bayesian games, but it faces conceptual limitations wh…
econ.TH2023★ 3 cited
Cursed Sequential Equilibrium
Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavi…
econ.TH2022★ 2 cited
Cognitive Hierarchies in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiment
Po-Hsuan Lin
Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consisten…