3 papers
econ.GN2026
Revisiting the Intra-Team Communication Method to Elicit Level-k Reasoning in Beauty Contests and 11-20 Games
Zitian Wang, Istiak Ahmed, Patarasate Unjitwattana +3
How level-0 players behave and how they are perceived by higher-level players are central questions in the literature on level-k models of boundedly rational strategic reasoning. T…
econ.GN2023
Measuring Higher-Order Rationality with Belief Control
Wei James Chen, Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin
Determining an individual's strategic reasoning capability based solely on choice data is a complex task. This complexity arises because sophisticated players might have non-equili…
econ.TH2023
A Comparison of Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium: Different Concepts of Cursedness in Dynamic Games
Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cursed Equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) has been a leading theory for explaining winner's-curse-type behavior in static Bayesian games, but it faces conceptual limitations wh…