4 papers
Learning Equilibria in Coordination Games via Minorization-Maximization
Ashok Krishnan K. S., Helene Le Cadre, Ana Busic
This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents…
Steering Noncooperative Games Through Conjecture Design
Francesco Morri, Hélène Le Cadre, David Salas +1
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not a…
Game Theory and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Zonal Ancillary Markets
Francesco Morri, Hélène Le Cadre, Pierre Gruet +1
We characterize zonal ancillary market coupling relying on noncooperative game theory. To that purpose, we formulate the ancillary market as a multi-leader single follower bilevel…
Learning in Conjectural Stackelberg Games
Francesco Morri, Hélène Le Cadre, Luce Brotcorne
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption i…