3 papers
econ.TH2026
Visibly Fair Mechanisms
Inácio Bó, Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as th…
econ.TH2026
Incentive-compatible public transportation fares with random inspection
Inácio Bó, Chiu Yu Ko
We consider the problem of designing prices for public transport where payment enforcing is done through random inspection of passengers' tickets as opposed to physically blocking…
econ.TH2026
Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service
Inácio Bó, Li Chen
We provide an original analysis of historical documents to describe the assignment procedures used to allocate entry-level civil service jobs in China from the tenth to the early t…