10 papers
Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…
Bitcoin Staking
Xinshu Dong, Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Ertem Nusret Tas +4
The idea of security sharing goes back to Nakamoto's introduction of merge mining, a technique that enables Bitcoin miners to reuse their hash power to bootstrap and secure other P…
Optimal Good-Case Latency for Sleepy Consensus
Yuval Efron, Joachim Neu, Ling Ren +1
In the context of Byzantine consensus problems such as Byzantine broadcast (BB) and Byzantine agreement (BA), the good-case setting aims to study the minimal possible latency of a…
From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu +2
This paper presents the first generic compiler that transforms any permissioned consensus protocol into a proof-of-stake permissionless consensus protocol. For each of the followin…
Consensus Under Adversary Majority Done Right
Srivatsan Sridhar, Ertem Nusret Tas, Joachim Neu +2
A specter is haunting consensus protocols--the specter of adversary majority. Dolev and Strong in 1983 showed an early possibility for up to 99% adversaries. Yet, other works show…
Commitment Attacks on Ethereum's Reward Mechanism
Roozbeh Sarenche, Ertem Nusret Tas, Barnabe Monnot +2
Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards f…