3 papers
cs.MA2026
The Communication Complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting
Ãlie de Panafieu, François Durand, Jérôme Lang
The communication complexity of a voting rule is the worst-case number of bits that n voters must transmit to a central authority under the most efficient elicitation protocol in a…
cs.GT2026
Super Condorcet Winners and Limit Coalitional Manipulability of IRV
François Durand, Ãlie de Panafieu, Guillem Perarnau
We study the limit CM rate of single-winner voting rules under Impartial Culture, defined as the probability that a preference profile is coalitionally manipulable in the limit of…
cs.GT2025
Why Instant-Runoff Voting Is So Resilient to Coalitional Manipulation: Phase Transitions in the Perturbed Culture
François Durand
Previous studies have shown that Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is highly resistant to coalitional manipulation (CM), though the theoretical reasons for this remain unclear. To addres…