3 papers
cs.GT2026
Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions
Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine +3
Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper…
q-fin.TR2026
Open vs. Sealed: Auction Format Choice for Maximal Extractable Value
Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine +3
We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers,…
q-fin.TR2026
Second Thoughts: How 1-second subslots transform CEX-DEX Arbitrage on Ethereum
Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine +3
This paper examines the impact of reducing Ethereum slot time on decentralized exchange activity, with a focus on CEX-DEX arbitrage behavior. We develop a trading model where the a…