3 papers
math.OC2026
Stackelberg stopping games
Jingjie Zhang, Zhou Zhou
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds…
q-fin.MF2026
Optimal Underreporting and Competitive Equilibrium
Zongxia Liang, Jiayu Zhang, Zhou Zhou +1
This paper develops a dynamic insurance market model comprising two competing insurance companies and a continuum of insureds, and examines the interaction between strategic underr…
math.OC2026
Mean-Field Games Under Model Uncertainty
Zongxia Liang, Zhou Zhou, Yaqi Zhuang +1
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its…