246 citations · 782 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers
Bidding Agent Design in the LinkedIn Ad Marketplace
Yuan Gao, Kaiyu Yang, Yuanlong Chen +2
We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic…
Learning in repeated auctions
Thomas Nedelec, Clément Calauzènes, Noureddine El Karoui +1
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has…
A Framework for Fairness in Two-Sided Marketplaces
Kinjal Basu, Cyrus DiCiccio, Heloise Logan +1
Many interesting problems in the Internet industry can be framed as a two-sided marketplace problem. Examples include search applications and recommender systems showing people, jo…
Adversarial learning for revenue-maximizing auctions
Thomas Nedelec, Jules Baudet, Vianney Perchet +1
We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assum…
Robust Stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions
Clément Calauzènes, Thomas Nedelec, Vianney Perchet +1
We consider the practical and classical setting where the seller is using an exploration stage to learn the value distributions of the bidders before running a revenue-maximizing a…
Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions
Thomas Nedelec, Noureddine El Karoui, Vianney Perchet
We consider the problem of the optimization of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the reserve prices based on the bid distribu…