6 papers
The Geography of (Concurrent) Block Proposing
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Mallesh M. Pai, Dan Robinson +1
The resilience and censorship resistance of a blockchain depend on where the validators and proposers of that blockchain physically operate. We study the economic incentives behind…
Uniform-Loss Automated Market Making for Prediction Markets
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Dan Robinson, Brian Zhu
Automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets descend from market scoring rules, where a mechanism operator subsidizes a market to aggregate beliefs about uncertain events.…
Latency Advantages in Common-Value Auctions
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Mallesh M. Pai, Dan Robinson
In financial applications, latency advantages -- the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done -- can provide individual pa…
Quantifying the Value of Revert Protection
Brian Z. Zhu, Xin Wan, Ciamac C. Moallemi +2
Revert protection is a feature provided by some blockchain platforms that prevents users from incurring fees for failed transactions. We study the economic implications and benefit…
Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Dan Robinson
Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky a…
am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker
Austin Adams, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Sara Reynolds +1
Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechani…