5 papers
GSP Autobidding Equilibria with Few Advertisers or Slots
Yiyang Huang, Zhengyang Liu, Yonglei Yan +1
In sponsored-shopping auctions, one advertiser may win several positions, and a product that is never displayed may determine the prices of several winners. Under generalized secon…
Tight Inapproximability of Pacing and Throttling Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions
Zhengyang Liu
Budget-constrained advertisers commonly rely on two control mechanisms: pacing scales bids, whereas throttling randomizes participation. We prove that, in second-price auctions, th…
Second-Best Bilateral Trade is Efficient
Zhengyang Liu, Ying Qin, Zeyu Ren +1
The landmark Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes a fundamental impossibility in bilateral trade: no Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism can simultaneously achieve ex-post…
Pacing Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Few Goods
Yiyang Huang, Yonglei Yan, Zihe Wang +1
In this paper, we investigate the computation of second-price pacing equilibria (SPPEs), a foundational model in online advertising auctions. We present a polynomial-time algorithm…
On the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies
Zhengyang Liu, Haolin Lu, Liang Shan +1
In this paper, we consider the dynamic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model, which involves multiple firms producing homogeneous products. To explore the oscillation under th…