33 citations · 242 across the 67 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction
Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta
The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is…
On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder +1
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two sim…
Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective
Nicolas Bousquet, Zhentao Li, Adrian Vetta
We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-…
A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
Nicolas Bousquet, Sergey Norin, Adrian Vetta
We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently…