From the 1 of 10 linked papers with an AI index.
10 papers
Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Yeeseok Oh, Dominik Peters
Approval-based committee (ABC) elections select a fixed-size committee of candidates based on voters' approval preferences. We study a setting where elected members may resign and…
Proportional Fairness for Harmful Decisions
Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Dominik Peters +1
The paper investigates how to fairly allocate divisible public bads by redefining the core for such settings and showing that Lindahl equilibria can satisfy these new fairness crit…
Kemeny Rank Aggregation is NP-Hard for Three Voters
Dominik Peters
Rank aggregation is the task of combining input rankings (linear orders) of alternatives into a single output ranking. The Kemeny rank aggregation rule selects the output ranki…
Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps
Christian Kroer, Dominik Peters
Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocat…
The Core of Approval-Based Committee Elections with Few Seats
Dominik Peters
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of out of candidates, based on voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the…
Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structur…