4 papers
Strategic Irreversible Investment
Jan-Henrik Steg
This paper studies oligopolistic irreversible investment with closed-loop strategies. These permit fully dynamic interactions that result in much richer strategic behavior than pre…
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
Jan-Henrik Steg, Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker +1
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-depende…
Preemptive Investment under Uncertainty
Jan-Henrik Steg
This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investmen…
Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Jan-Henrik Steg
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different…