45 citations · 76 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Strategic Irreversible Investment
Jan-Henrik Steg
This paper studies oligopolistic irreversible investment with closed-loop strategies. These permit fully dynamic interactions that result in much richer strategic behavior than pre…
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
Jan-Henrik Steg, Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker +1
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-depende…
Preemptive Investment under Uncertainty
Jan-Henrik Steg
This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investmen…
Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Jan-Henrik Steg
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different…
Quick or Persistent? Strategic Investment Demanding Versatility
Jan-Henrik Steg, Jacco Thijssen
In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We constr…
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Frank Riedel, Jan-Henrik Steg
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-per…
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Control Approach
Giorgio Ferrari, Frank Riedel, Jan-Henrik Steg
In this paper we study continuous-time stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical controls motivated by the so-called public good contribution problem. That is th…