3 papers
econ.TH2026
Designing Signals for Deterrence
Hiroto Sawada, Raphael Boleslavsky, Kristopher W. Ramsay +1
States and alliances spend enormous resources signaling resolve to deter adversaries. Two canonical strategies are burning money (sunk costs) and burning bridges (audience costs).…
econ.TH2026
Algorithm Transparency and Search Manipulation: Steering vs. Persuasion
Raphael Boleslavsky, Thomas Jungbauer, Mehdi Shadmehr
We study a platform that prefers to sell the more profitable of two products. It designs an algorithm that determines the product the consumer encounters first, conditional on her…
econ.TH2025
Revealed and Concealed Repression: Theory and Measurement
Maria Titova, Nathan Canen, Emily Hencken Ritter +1
Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. T…