4 papers
cs.GT2026
A Note on Learnable Nash Equilibrium
Songzi Du
A Nash equilibrium is learnable if there exists a myopic adjustment dynamic for which it is asymptotically stable. In generic symmetric two-player games, a Nash equilibrium is lear…
cs.GT2016
Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
Songzi Du
We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers'…
q-fin.TR2010
Chaos and Unraveling in Matching Markets
Songzi Du, Yair Livne
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do n…
math.PR2009
Random Walks on Dicyclic Group
Songzi Du
This paper works out the rate of convergence of two "natural" random walks on the dicyclic group.