most citedFrequency-Domain Regularized Adversarial Alignment for Transferable Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs

1 citations · 1 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.AI2026

SafeEvolve: Harness-Policy Co-Evolution from Agent Experience for Safety Alignment

Qinghua Mao, Wanying Qu, Dadi Guo +8

The performance of LLM-based agents is jointly shaped by the base model and the harness used when interacting with the environment. This exposes them to safety risks in both harmfu…

cs.AI2026

SHE: Trajectory-driven Safety Harness Evolution for LLM Agents

Wanying Qu, Qinghua Mao, Yu Li +12

The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime contro…

cs.AI2026

COLLEAGUE.SKILL: Automated AI Skill Generation via Expert Knowledge Distillation

Tianyi Zhou, Dongrui Liu, Leitao Yuan +2

LLM agents are increasingly expected not only to complete isolated tasks, but also to carry bounded representations of human expertise, judgment, and interaction style. Building su…

cs.AI2026

AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security

Dongrui Liu, Yu Li, Zhonghao Yang +47

Modern open-world agents such as OpenClaw exhibit powerful cross-environment execution capabilities yet introduce broad new safety risk sources. Meanwhile, advanced frontier AI mod…

cs.CR20261 cited

Frequency-Domain Regularized Adversarial Alignment for Transferable Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs

Leitao Yuan, Qinghua Mao, Daizong Liu +5

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) remain vulnerable to transfer-based targeted attacks, where perturbations optimized on open-source surrogate encoders can generalize to clo…

cs.AI2026

AgentDoG: A Diagnostic Guardrail Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security

Dongrui Liu, Qihan Ren, Chen Qian +40

The rise of AI agents introduces complex safety and security challenges arising from autonomous tool use and environmental interactions. Current guardrail models lack agentic risk…