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cs.GT2026
Computing stable limit cycles of learning in games
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou
Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general -player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cycl…
cs.GT2026
On the Complexity of Learning Nash Equilibria
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras
We know that the Nash equilibria of a game cannot be computed efficiently unless . But can they be learned? Are there dynamics that (1) can be computed efficiently by the…
cs.GT2025★ 1 cited
Sink equilibria and the attractors of learning in games
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou
Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work on this front, it…